Introduction
The current global economic and fi nancial crisis has challenged the mechanism of economic policy coordination in the European Union.
1 Since 2008 all EU countries have been affected by this crisis, 2 most of them have been in recession, or close to it. The insolvent, in particular, PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) cannot fi nance their defi cits on their own in open credit markets. They are suffering from high government defi cits and can keep on spending only by way of loans from international organizations.
3 Their debt ratings have been downgraded by various credit rating institutions and their unemployment rates are reaching record highs. 4 On the other hand, banks within wealthier EU member countries, such as Germany, hold PIIGS bond debt (notably that of Greece), and have had their central banks' credit ratings downgraded because of this exposure. In this respect, several attempts have already been made to explain the divergence between former economic plans and current fi nancial outcomes, focusing mostly on the role of the economic cycle as an explanatory factor.
6 Nonetheless, the current economic crisis raises important questions about the future of the EU economy. Can the EU countries continue with public spending on such a grand scale? Can they continue generating defi cits? Finally, can they really pay back their debt in full?
Austerity vs. anti-austerity
Austerity and anti-austerity have become hot-topics in the current economic debate.
7 First, there seems to be no doubt that the origin of public debt is closely associated with the existence of a long process of public sector defi cit.
8 Some economists though see fi nancial busts as largely unpredictable events that governments must prevent at all cost. Accordingly they demand that governments enhance (even profl igate) their expenditure.
9 Against the crisis, in fact, many countries chose the way of borrowing to fi nance their public expenditures.
10 For one thing, a fi scal rule that is appropriate for the long term -for example a structural balanced budget rule -cannot be instantly enforced, some mainstream economists say, when the starting point is a defi cit close to double digits.
11 Besides, the EU member states and the EU itself have provided fi nancial support to a number of crises-stricken (not able to meet their international payment obligations) EU countries. Alongside the assistance programs and the temporary fund delivery vehicles, the eurozone member states have put together the permanent additional European Stability Mechanism offering assistance to countries facing diffi culties fi nancing their debt. On the other hand some economist explain fi nancial crisis as the inevitable result of the unsustainable artifi cial boom provoked by government intervention in general and excessive expansion of credit in particular 12 and they recommend that governments slash their spending. Today's politicians usually denigrate austerity. They say it has gone too far and is preventing an economic recovery.
14 But taking a somewhat closer look at the actual statistics available from Eurostat on the, in particular, PIIGS-countries, one fi nds in fact little empirical evidence that the European governments there have de facto reduced their total public expenditures.
15 In other words, government spending has never really stopped rising in the EU as a whole since the beginning of the fi nancial crisis. Spending grew during the period when so called "austerity" policies were supposed to have been applied. Whenever budget cuts were announced, it usually meant actually not total reductions in spending, just simply spending increases that were lower than what was previously planned. Governments maybe have not been borrowing as much, although still heavily and in the end public debt kept increasing. Instead, these governments tax their citizens more to fund their growing expenditures. France, where "austerity" has been most strongly criticized is a good example here. Finally, European governments are now usually as large as they were when the crisis struck in 2007.
16 Unlike genuine austerity, which shrinks the state's income statement and balance sheet, false-austerity, which is typically fi nanced by borrowing, creates an ever-bigger state expenditure. 
Sound economic principles and spirit of the EU Treaties
Some countries have developed explicit links between the level of public investment and the public debt level. This may include the so called "golden rule", that increases in the amount of public debt should not exceed net public investment, conventions limiting the budget balance or conventions limiting the total level of public debt. The "golden rule" and budget balance are, for example, specifi ed in the German Constitution. The Netherlands also used to apply this rule. The United Kingdom introduced a policy in 1997 under which the budget is balanced over the economic cycle, with no exceptions.
18
EU monetary policy is also an issue here. This policy is now determined solely by the European Central Bank. The ECB was insulated from political interference and given a mandate to focus on price stability. The eurozone monetary mechanisms were similar to those of the former gold standard. 21 Finally, establishing a multi-annual fi scal framework in the EU proved to be very important as a basis for effi cient planning of public expenditure and to achieve compatibility with EU procedures.
Besides, membership of the EU imposes many legal obligations and requirements on member states. In the fi eld of fi scal policy and budgetary management, these obligations mainly relate to compliance with fi scal policy targets, the provision of statistical data, anti-fraud procedures and regulations concerning fi nancial control. For EU members, some kind of austerity is not just a promise: it's a treaty obligation. The Maastricht Treaty required that countries joining the Union should have budget defi cits no higher than 3 percent of GDP and debt levels no higher than 60 percent. Next, the Stability and Growth Pact demanded that the EU countries aim for "medium-term objectives of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus". In the face of debt crisis and the possibility of PIIGS default on a debt, the EU has modifi ed its economic model. Adopted in March 2011 as the more stringent successor to the former SGP and using the EU's open method of coordination, the Euro-Plus Pact created concrete commitments in which the member nations of the EU are forced to abide to a list of fi scal reforms intended to enhance their fi scal strength and discipline.
22 There are also some relevant extra-community methods in this respect. In particular, The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governancewhich have been adopted by groups of EU states outside of the treaty and legislative structures of the EU.
23 What is particularly new about the TSCG is that the balanced budget rule is to be embedded and enforced within national law. An European constitution, agreed on by citizens, binding the member states would be probably the best answer to ensure fi scal discipline among EU member countries. Though the former proposed EU Constitution was in fact no real constitution 25 and deteriorated even before it was approved. the accumulation of large fi scal defi cits in the Union. For example, on January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth nation to join the eurozone. In order to qualify for euro membership, the Greek government was required to agree to adopt strict measures, mainly through some serious cuts in public expenditure. The Greek government hid the true level of its debt. Similarly, several other governments were able to cheat in fact to meet the Maastricht rules.
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Anyway, fi scal rules, at both EU and national level, have been so much fl outed in most member states that ever-increasing government debt resulted from the lack of transposition of European good governance.
28 Indeed, few governments ever took "Maastricht criteria" seriously.
29 Now, by these criteria the average EU country doesn't qualify for admission into the EU!
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Along with no respect for the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, there is an unwillingness at EU level to impose sanctions for their breach.
31 Although the excessive defi cit procedure was activated both for large and peripheral countries, the sanctions mechanism was not adequately implemented and the debt ratio standard was on several occasions just ignored.
In principle, then, "austerity" can thus cover all kinds of situations with differing economic impacts. Unfortunately, confusion over the meaning of the term impedes a better understanding of the current situation.
32 It seems to be universally taken for granted in current economic debate that austerity measures adopted in the EU have meant drastic spending cuts, coupled sometimes with some tax increases, the net effect being a downsizing of government. But is this really the case?
33 By the original Maastricht criteria, there is simply no "austerity" in Europe. Virtually without exception, member states of the EU aren't honouring their legal obligations. 34 The problems of the Pact on Stability and Growth are just as illustrative. The lack of authority in the Stability and Growth Pact led several member nations to stray from the minimum debt recommendations. 35 The German government broke the rules on budgetary defi cits for up to fi ve years. They did not, however, expect any serious fi nancial punishment. By the outbreak of the current crisis, the Pact had ceased to be credible.
36 With the recently revised rules the member states can almost always get away with a larger defi cit. 37 The same with EPP, the approval of the Euro-Plus Pact made integrated fi scal policy within the EMU a recommendation and not a requirement. In order to infl uence the Greek debt crisis, the ECB changed its monetary policy by readjusting collateral requirements to ensure that the Greek public remained eligible to take out loans. On May 3, 2010, the ECB suspended its minimal credit rating threshold for collateral eligibility and then it announced measures to address severe tensions in certain market segments.
38 As a result not only the commercial banks, but governments running huge public defi cits could safely count on a bailout. What is worse is that the European commercial banks continue to have no incentives to rationalize their investment portfolio since they can always rely on the ECB's plans to secure "fi nancial stability" in the EMU.
39 The ECB's policy was and is, to bailout the banking system through: credit to governments in distress and lower interest rates. This policy is bound to replicate in the future the problems of the past.
40 European governments seem very reluctant to give up their extended welfare programs, but at the same time they are usually unable to fi nance these programs through taxes. Nonetheless this feature of political landscape should not be allowed to become an excuse for forcing the ECB into a role beyond its proper legal limits.
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Besides, it is worth mentioning, EU treaties oblige most of its non EMU members to join the Eurozone at some point. But this formal obligation has little weight in practice, as Sweden has demonstrated.
What Europe really needs now is addressing long term issues. That means that decision-makers should overcome their pressing daily preoccupations to tackle problems that will determine the next years or decades.
42 As an American economist M.N. Rothbard stated, if we immerse ourselves wholly in day-to-day affairs, we cease making fundamental distinctions, or asking the really basic questions. Soon, basic issues are forgotten, and aimless drift is substituted for fi rm adherence to principle.
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The problem is, that EU member countries in general prefer to exercise individual control over what their expenses are and will be and they are interested mainly in short term perspective.
44 Another problem is the temptation of governments to base these short or medium term plans on macroeconomic forecasts which refl ect their politically driven aspirations, rather than objective analysis with long term perspective.
45 Besides, trying to integrate an individual EU member nation's fi scal policies still is a very sensitive subject area because it reduces national sovereignty. Then, the Community method is often treated, quite rightly, as a synonym for rules- based governance in which 'supranational' actors have the leading role. 46 And maybe this is the only method to guaranty a strictly enforced fi scal stability rule which would force national governments to cut expenditure instantly, not in the indefi nite future.
Conclusion
At the Spring summit, in March 2010, EU Heads of State endorsed the European Commission's proposal for a Europe 2020 economic strategy. José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, urged national and local authority leaders to make sure that culture is fi rmly anchored in the long-term development strategies. 47 This should be used to attain the medium term objective and ensure long-term sustainability of public fi nances. Markets will only be reassured by credible, longterm plans to cut defi cits and debt. Only then can sustainable growth resume.
It became crucial that an appropriate reform of fi scal frameworks within the EU should be instituted. 48 In the Spring of 2013, a period of sustained legislative activity to strengthen EU economic governance seemed to come to an end. With it, 'six pack' and 'two pack' enter into force, completing the budgetary surveillance cycle and further improving European economic governance. Comprising a total of seven regulations and one directive, the 'six pack' and 'two pack' have been visible symbols of the EU's attempt to respond to an economic crisis. 49 In particular, Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011, on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, includes these requirements: 1/ there is a need to build upon the experience gained during the fi rst decade of the economic and monetary union; 2/ medium-term budgetary frameworks shall include procedures for an assessment as to how in the light of their direct long-term impact on general government fi nances, the policies envisaged are likely to affect the long-term sustainability of the public fi nances.
High levels of public debt cannot be sustained indefi nitely. What happens if nothing is done? What happens if we forget about long term perspective and still focus on and stick to current issues? Clearly, as public debt rises, eventually default becomes likely. More likely, a break-up would take place amid plunging share prices, maybe runs on banks. Capital controls are illegal in the EU and the break-up of the euro system is outside the law, so the whole system would be cast into legal limbo. 50 Changes in EU economic governance cannot meaningfully be understood as mere switches from soft to hard legal rules or from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism. 51 Long term perspective taken into account by decision makers seems to be sine qua non condition in this respect. It is a cliché today that if we do not study the past we are condemned to repeat it. 
